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Abstract
Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium inde-
terminacy in Common Knowledge Coordination games, where fundamentals are com-
monly known by all players. Global games assume that agents face idiosyncratic un-
certainty about economic fundamentals, whereas Poisson games model the number
of actual players as a Poisson random variable to capture population uncertainty in
large games. The present study investigates in a controlled setup, using as controls
Common Knowledge Coordination games, whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about eco-
nomic fundamentals or uncertainty about the number of actual players may influence
subjects’ behavior. Our findings suggest that uncertainty about the number of actual
players has a more significant impact on subjects’ behavior than idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty about economic fundamentals. Furthermore, subjects’ behavior under Poisson
population-size uncertainty is closer to the respective theoretical prediction than sub-
jects’ behavior under idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals.
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1 Introduction
Coordination games with strategic complementarities have been widely used to cap-
ture setups, such as speculative attacks, start-up investments and new technology
adoption under network externalities (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Obst-
feld (1996)). If the state of the economy (i.e. profitability of the risky action) and
the number of stakeholders/players is common knowledge, then, equilibrium cannot
always be pinned down uniquely because beliefs can be indeterminate. To escape
a prediction of indeterminancy of equilibria, the received theoretical literature has
focused on uncertainty about fundamentals (see e.g. Morris and Shin (1998), Herren-
dorf, Valentinyi, and Waldman (2000), Frankel and Pauzner (2000), Burdzy, Frankel,
and Pauzner (2001) and Makris (2008)).
Global Coordination games (see Morris and Shin (1998)) constitute the most
popular approach to escape the prediction of equilibrium indeterminacy by means
of deploying uncertainty about economic fundamentals (e.g. the profitability of a
successful speculative attack). A more recent approach, Poisson Coordination games,
is motivated instead by the fact that, in the above strategic environments, the number
of economic agents is often very large. As Myerson (2000) points out, in games with
a very large number of players, “it is unrealistic to assume that every player knows
all the other players in the game; instead, a more realistic model should admit some
uncertainty about the number of players in the game” (p. 7). Following the suggestion
of Myerson (2000), this approach models the number of actual players as a Poisson
random variable (see Makris (2008)).1
Importantly, Global and Poisson Coordination games lead to different predictions.
The Global Coordination game prediction about, say, the onset of speculative attacks
manifests a threshold level of economic fundamentals that defines two areas in the
region where Common Knowledge Coordination games predict multiplicity of equi-
1This modelling choice is driven, in part, by certain convenient properties of the Poisson distri-
bution (see Myerson (1998)). As a complementary justification for this modelling choice, suppose
that the identity of every stakeholder is common knowledge and that binding individual orders for,
say, short sales of a currency must arrive with the central bank by a given time. Standard theory
suggests that each agent will decide on her action by taking the number of orders at the collector’s
disposal as given. However, the probability that a phone call to a busy switchboard will go through
or the webpage of an online site will be uploaded successfully at times of high traffic decreases with
the number of stakeholders. As a result, and under the assumption that the average number of
successful phone calls or online visits is known, in a large environment, stakeholders should actually
view the number of actual players in the Coordination game as a Poisson random variable.
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libria: one in which a successful attack takes place, and another, where a successful
attack does not materialize. However, the Poisson Coordination game prediction is
that no speculative attack will take place as long as the ratio of the short-selling cost
per reward is greater than the probability of having sufficiently many players in the
game; otherwise, multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes still arises (see Section 3 for
more details).
Motivated by the aforementioned theoretical papers, the present study investigates
in a controlled setup, using as controls Common Knowledge Coordination games,
whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals or uncertainty about
the number of actual players may influence subjects’ behavior. Specifically, we design
a novel experiment to compare the behavior of subjects in Poisson, Common Knowl-
edge and Global Coordination games (henceforth, for brevity, referred to as Poisson,
Common Knowledge and Global games, respectively, unless there is a risk of confu-
sion). The experimental design is formulated around asking subjects to state their
intent to buy a cash amount.2 Registering to buy the cash amount entails paying a
non-refundable fee, which is less than the cash amount. Additionally, in order to get
the cash amount, a threshold number of registrations has to be met. If fewer subjects
than the number dictated by the threshold register, then, the cash amount is not
awarded.
We make three key contributions in this paper. First, to the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first to provide an experimental investigation of Poisson Coordination
games. Games assuming Poisson population-size uncertainty have been studied the-
oretically in mostly Voting games (see e.g. Krishna and Morgan (2011), Bouton and
Castanheira (2012), Medina (2013), Bouton and Gratton (2015)) and Discrete Pub-
lic Goods games (Makris (2009)). The only other experimental studies of Poisson
games we know of are those of Ostling, Wang, Chou, and Camerer (2011) and Her-
rera, Morelli, and Palfrey (2014). Ostling, Wang, Chou, and Camerer (2011) study
the Swedish Lowest Unique Positive Integer (LUPI) game, and find that the behav-
ioral patterns of the field and laboratory data are closely related with the theoretical
predictions. Herrera, Morelli, and Palfrey (2014) investigate a voter turnout model,
where they compare the turnout in two electoral systems: a winner-takes-all system,
2In the lingo of the speculative attack model of Morris and Shin (1998), registering to buy the
cash amount is analogous to short selling the currency. Alternatively, in the context of investors and
technology adopters under network externalities, registering to buy the cash amount is analogous to
undertaking the investment opportunity and adopting the new technology, respectively.
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and a proportional power sharing system. Their results from a laboratory experiment
are broadly supportive of the theoretical predictions.
The second key contribution of our study is methodological. Specifically, our
experiments are conducted over the Internet. Internet is ideal for Poisson games as
subjects cannot infer the number of participants, which is typically the case in a
laboratory experiment. Crucially, in order to circumvent the difficulties that would
arise given the (assumed) unfamiliarity of many subjects with Poisson probabilities,
we applied the specific probabilities onto a roulette wheel and noted that the latter is
not a standard wheel. In order to maintain consistency with the Poisson experiments,
the Global and the baseline (i.e. Common Knowledge) sessions were also conducted
over the Internet while accommodating the underlying assumptions of the theories.
A value-added of this approach is that it resembles how managers and investors
commit to their decisions nowadays: after contemplating the pros and cons of various
alternatives, managers and investors will often place their (short-selling, purchase or
investment) orders online.
Our third and most important contribution is substantive. We find that uncer-
tainty about the number of actual players has a more significant impact on subjects’
behavior than idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals when we focus
on parameters for which both Poisson and Global games predict a unique equilib-
rium. Specifically, we find that, in their vast majority, subjects in the Poisson games
forego to register to buy the cash amount (i.e. choose the ‘safe’ action), whereas in
both Global and Common Knowledge games, subjects split almost evenly between
foregoing registering to buy the cash amount and registering to buy the cash amount.
Therefore, the introduction of uncertainty regarding the number of actual players may
influence empirical behavior in large environments with strategic complementarities,
whereas the introduction of idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals
may not. Finally, subjects’ behavior under Poisson population-size uncertainty is
closer to the respective theoretical prediction than subjects’ behavior under idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals.
The paper adheres to the following plan. We present next other related exper-
imental literature. In Section 3, we review the theoretical predictions of Common
Knowledge, Global and Poisson games. In Section 4, the experimental design is pre-
sented. In Section 5, we report the results of our experiments. In Section 6, we
conduct a robustness analysis and in Section 7, we discuss comparative statics and a
3
possible explanation for the main results based on limited depth of reasoning. Finally,
in Section 8, we conclude and offer suggestions for future research.
2 Other Related Experimental Literature
Common Knowledge Coordination games have been studied extensively experimen-
tally (see e.g. Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990), Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil
(1991), Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1993), Brandts and Cooper (2006), Cooper,
Ioannou, and Qi (2018)). Regarding experimental studies of Global Coordination
games, we are aware only of the following three studies. Heinemann, Nagel, and
Ockenfels (2004) study an experiment that resembles the speculative attack model of
Morris and Shin (1998), but with repeated play. In comparing sessions between Com-
mon Knowledge and Global Coordination games, they find that subjects use threshold
strategies in both informational protocols. In the Global games, they find that ob-
served behavior is closer to the Global game solution. In their setup, the relevant
economic fundamental is the profit from short selling the currency, which is drawn
anew at the start of each repeated interaction.3 In the Common Knowledge games,
the authors find that observed behavior lies between the payoff-dominant equilibrium
and the Global game solution.
Cabrales, Nagel, and Armenter (2007) study an experiment that resembles the
2 × 2 setup of Carlsson and van Damme (1993). Analogous to Heinemann, Nagel,
and Ockenfels (2004), Cabrales, Nagel, and Armenter (2007) also investigate subjects’
behavior in Common Knowledge and Global Coordination games, but distinguish be-
tween short-term and long-term play. The authors utilize a discrete state space with
five possible states and signals to make the theoretic reasoning simpler. Cabrales,
Nagel, and Armenter (2007) find that in the Global games with long-term play, sub-
jects’ behavior converges towards the Global game solution. The authors also find
that in the Common Knowledge games with short-term play, observed behavior of
3The context of a subject’s decision differs in our setup compared to the one in Heinemann,
Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004). In our setup, a subject has to sacrifice an amount of money (pay a
non-refundable fee) from the initial endowment to buy the cash amount. Otherwise, a subject gets
to keep the endowed amount. In the study of Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004), subjects are
required to decide between the safe and the risky action; however, the risky action does not take
away any money from their total earnings.
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subjects can be anywhere (weakly) between the payoff-dominant equilibrium and the
Global game solution. Moreover, Cabrales, Nagel, and Armenter (2007) establish
that subjects’ behavior across the Common Knowledge and Global games with short-
term play is statistically similar. This is a departure from the findings of Heinemann,
Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004). According to Cabrales, Nagel, and Armenter (2007) (p.
232), the difference in results may be driven by the absence of learning effects.
Szkup and Trevino (2015) implement a different informational structure than the
two previous studies. Specifically, the authors develop a two-stage model, where each
agent, in the first stage, has the possibility to choose, at a cost, the precision of their
private signal, and, in the second stage, play the Coordination game, as in Morris
and Shin (1998), using the information acquired in the first stage. Szkup and Trevino
(2015) prove existence of a unique equilibrium in their model. However, contrary to
the theoretical predictions, they find that as subjects choose more precise information
they coordinate more often on attacking the currency, and as a result attacks are more
successful when agents hold more precise information.
3 Theoretical Predictions
We deploy the canonical Coordination game used in Morris and Shin (1998) (with
different notation). Denote by N the number of players, who decide whether to reg-
ister to buy the cash amount (referred to simply as “register” hereafter) or abstain
from registering to buy the cash amount (referred to simply as “abstain” hereafter).
Assume that indifferent players choose not to register. Denote by T the registration
fee, Y the state of economic fundamentals, and Y/2 the cash amount gross of the
fee with Y ∈ {Ymin, Ymin + 1, ..., Ymax − 1, Ymax}. Here, the state of economic fun-
damentals Y reflects profitability (i.e. the size of the cash amount). In particular,
Ymin is the worst state in terms of profits, whereas Ymax is the most profitable state.
The cash amount is awarded if the number of registered players is at least as high
as α(Y ). Therefore, after letting ν be the number of other players who register, and








. The function α(.) and the registration fee are common knowl-
edge. We set α(Y ) = C − Y
D
with C > 0, D > 0, and C − Ymax
D
≤ 1. The last
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condition states that in the state Ymax, the cash amount is awarded even if only one
player registers. Note that for Y ≥ Y ≡ α−1(1), a single registration is enough for
the cash amount to be awarded, while for Y < Y more than one registrations will
typically be needed. We assume that 2T < Y to ensure that it is not weakly domi-
nant to abstain from registering when Y < Y . Let Y be the largest of the economic
fundamentals 2T and α−1(N). It is dominant to abstain for any state Y < Y . To
ensure that this range of fundamentals is non-empty we assume 2T > Ymin.
We distinguish between three cases regarding agents’ information about economic
fundamentals and the number of players. In the first case, there is common knowledge
of economic fundamentals and the number of players. We refer to the corresponding
strategic interaction as the Common Knowledge game. In this game, zero registrations
(the maximin outcome) is the unique equilibrium outcome for Y < Y .4 Furthermore,
N registrations (the payoff-dominant outcome) is the unique equilibrium for Y ≥ Y .
However, in the “grey area” (i.e. in the remaining area of economic fundamentals)
there is multiplicity of equilibria. Depending on self-fulfilling beliefs both the maximin
and payoff-dominant outcomes (zero and N registrations, respectively) are equilibria.
The other two cases are captured by the Global and Poisson games. To facilitate
their comparison with each other and with the Common Knowledge games, we note
here that both Global (due to being Bayesian) games and Poisson games are subsumed
by the general class of population uncertainty games, with each of them emerging from
different informational structures.5 In Global games, the number (and identity) of
players in the game N is common knowledge and players receive private identically
distributed and conditionally independent signals/hints about the unknown state of
economic fundamentals Y . The set of signals is {xmin, xmin + 1, ..., xmax − 1, xmax}
and we denote a generic element of this with x or y. In the Poisson games, economic
fundamentals are common knowledge, whereas it is commonly understood that the
number of actual players in the game is a Poisson random variable with mean n. In
Poisson games, the only signal players receive reveals to them whether they are active
players in the game. Given the aforementioned framework, a natural question is: how
4If Y= 2T , then registering when Y = Y is never profitable because even if enough registrations
are made so that the cash amount is awarded, the latter just covers the registration fee. Therefore,
it is weakly dominant to forego registering when Y = Y = 2T .
5In general population uncertainty games, the number of players of each type is a random variable.
When these are Poisson random variables, and the type set is singleton, the game reduces to a Poisson
one. When the type set is not singleton, but the realizations that feature more than N players carry
zero probability, the game reduces to a Bayesian one with N players. See Myerson (1998) for details.
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does behavior change under the informational structures in the Global and Poisson
games vis-a-vis the common knowledge environment? We answer this question by
comparing the changes in subjects’ behavior due to alternative elements of uncertainty
by using as reference the behavior under common knowledge.
Consider first the Global games, where we suppress the dependence of various
variables on the commonly known N to simplify notation. Denote the conditional
probability distribution of the signal of a player with Pr(x|Y ). Let also Pr(Y |y) be
the posterior belief of a player with signal y over the state of economic fundamentals
Y . We will say that a distribution f first-order stochastically dominates distribution
f ′ if the cumulative of f is (weakly) lower than the cumulative of f ′. We assume:
A1: Pr(·|y′) first-order stochastically dominates Pr(·|y) for all y′ > y.
A2: Pr(·|Y ′) first-order stochastically dominates Pr(·|Y ) for all Y ′ > Y .
A1 says that the higher the received signal is, the more likely it is that the economic
fundamentals are high. A2 says that the higher the state of economic fundamentals,
the more likely it is that the signals received by the players are high.
From the point of view of a player with signal y who registers, the number of other
players registering when all other players are expected to register if their signal is
higher than x, and the economic fundamentals are Y , is a binomial random variable
with size parameter N − 1 and “success probability”
∑xmax
x̃=x+1 Pr(x̃|Y ). Thus, the
probability attached by a player with signal y who registers on the event that the
threshold is met, when all other players are expected to register if their signal is higher






















where the symbolic function ⌈·⌉ rounds-up the fraction to the nearest integer from
above. Note that a binomial distribution with some parameters first-order stochas-
tically dominates a binomial distribution with lower parameters. Given A2, we then
have that G(Y, x) is non-decreasing in Y , and non-increasing in x.
Let us now focus on a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) where all
players register if and only if their signal is higher than x∗ (i.e. use a threshold
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Pr(Y |y)G(Y, x∗)Y/2 > T, if and only if y > x∗. (1)
The above condition expresses, in effect, that an expected utility maximizer will not
take the bet if the expected profit is not higher than the price, where, here, taking
the bet is identified with the act of registering, the price is identified with the fee and
the expected profit with the left-hand side of the above inequality. Note that A1 and
the aforementioned properties of G imply that the left-hand side of the inequality in
(1) is non-decreasing in y and non-increasing in x∗, and so x∗ may not be unique.
To characterize the threshold signals x∗, in our experiments, we assume that the
posterior Pr(Y |y) is the uniform distribution over {y−εY , y−εY +1, ..., y+εY −1, y+
εY } and that Pr(x|Y ) is the uniform distribution over {Y −εY , Y −εY +1, ..., Y +εY −
1, Y + εY } where εY := Ymin − xmin = xmax − Ymax > 0. These satisfy assumptions
A1 and A2, and so condition (1) is valid for our experiments. As we discuss in the
next section, parameters are chosen to ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome.
This will be the case if the realized Y is such that Y + εY ≤ x
∗ (and so no player
registers), or such that Y −εY > x
∗ (and so all players register), for all x∗ that satisfy
(1).
We turn to the Poisson games. Let F (· | n) denote the Poisson cumulative dis-
tribution function with parameter n. It is straightforward to see that if Y ≤ 2T ,
then it is never profitable to register. Moreover, if Y ≥ Y , then a single registration
is enough for the cash amount to be awarded, and so every player finds it optimal
to register. If 2T < Y < Y , then all players in the game abstaining is clearly an
equilibrium regardless of the realized number of other players. If, however, the typ-
ical other player in the game registers with some strictly positive probability, then
beliefs about the number of other players is important for decisions. According to
the “environmental equivalence” property, shown in Myerson (1998), from the point
of view of a player who has found himself in the game, the number of other players
is a Poisson random variable with the mean number be equal to the mean number
of players from the point of view of an outsider (or a potential player); that is n. It
follows that if all other players in the game register, F (ν|n) is the probability from
the point of view of a player in the game that there will be ν registrations from the
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other players in the game. Then, clearly, when
[




no player registering is the unique symmetric equilibrium.6 Importantly, the calcu-
lations for the derivation of the the left-hand side of the inequality in (1) are more
complex than those for the derivation of the left-hand side of the above inequality.
4 Experimental Design
Our experimental setup features a coordination problem that is examined under id-
iosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals (i.e. a Global Coordination
game) and Poisson population-size uncertainty (i.e. a Poisson Coordination game).
As a baseline, we use a setup where economic fundamentals and number of players is
common knowledge (i.e. a Common Knowledge Coordination game).
4.1 Design Choices
Before elaborating on the experimental procedures, we offer some clarifications with
respect to our design choices. The experiments were conducted over the Internet. In-
ternet is ideal for Poisson games as subjects cannot infer the number of participants,
which is typically the case in a laboratory experiment. To maintain consistency with
the Poisson treatments, the Global treatments and the controls based on Common
Knowledge games were also conducted over the Internet. A disadvantage of running
experiments over the Internet is that it becomes very hard to monitor participants’
engagement with the game. In particular, there is no control over what participants
are doing. For instance, participants could take a break to call someone, to browse the
web, to eat pizza, to have a coffee etc. To safeguard against such distractions and to
maintain subjects’ focus to the game, the screens included timers that allowed a lim-
ited, but sufficient amount of time to read comfortably the instructions. In addition,
6As shown in Makris (2008), condition (2) ensures that no player registering is the unique equi-
librium (in pure strategies), while if condition (2) is not satisfied then multiplicity of equilibria
emerges.
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the inclusion of timers minimized the possibility of wired or wireless communication.
Once the time lapsed, the subjects would concurrently move to the next screen.7
The level of Y was drawn from the set of integers 5 to 95 according to the uniform
distribution. For design reasons, the level of Y was drawn ahead of all experiments
conducted. The drawn Y was 25. In Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004),
there is a one-to-one map between the Y and the cash amount. However, a cash
amount of £25 seems unreasonably high for an experiment lasting approximately 20
minutes. Instead, we decided to offer the cash amount of £Y
2
(i.e. £12.50). To ensure
comparability across game types, the cash amount used in Common Knowledge and
Poisson games was also set to £12.50.
Poisson and Global games have been proposed to address equilibrium indetermi-
nacy in Common Knowledge Coordination games. Thus, suitable parameters should
be chosen to satisfy the requirement of multiplicity in the Common Knowledge games
and uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome in the Poisson and Global games. Specifi-
cally, parameters should be chosen such that the drawn Y lies within the “grey area”
of Y and Y , and the rest of the parameters satisfy condition (2) while ensuring that
the symmetric BNE in threshold strategies of the Global games (recall (1)) imply the
same behavior regardless of the realized signals to simplify the cognitive requirements
for subjects. However, given that choosing parameters such that all players do reg-
ister under symmetric BNE in threshold strategies of the Global games would imply
multiplicity of equilibria in the corresponding Poisson games,8 we chose parameters
such that the prediction of the Global games prescribes, similar to Poisson games,
that all players would not register irrespective of the realized signals.
Finally, we restricted our attention to single-shot experiments. In real life, for
many applications of Coordination games, there are ample (personal or social) learn-
ing opportunities. Therefore, it would have been interesting to study the impact of
7In the questionnaire that followed the game-play stage, none of the subjects reported running
out of time while reading the instructions on any of the screens.
8The way we have checked this is as follows. We asked, for given Ymax and Ymin, what are the
values for N , C, D, T and εY that satisfy the various constraints of the model and maximize the
difference Y P − (xG + εY ), where Y
P is the solution to condition (2) as an equality, and xG is the
highest symmetric BNE threshold signal. We have solved this optimization problem numerically
by deploying the genetic algorithm in MATLAB (R2014b), with ‘initial population’ size of 2900
admissible profiles of control variables (N , C, D, T , εY ), and requiring that N and εY are integers.
We found that the value function of this problem is negative. This implies that the only states Y that
would generate signals that are higher than any symmetric BNE threshold signal (i.e. Y > xG+εY )
are higher than Y P and thereby violate condition (2).
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learning on subjects’ behavior with iterative play. Despite our desire to investigate
the three game types experimentally in a repeated setup, such task was deemed un-
fruitful. To see why, recall, first, that Global games put emphasis on uncertainty
about economic fundamentals, and hence such uncertainty should be preserved when
studying learning in repeated play. In other words, echoing also the approach in
Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels (2004), Y must be drawn anew at the start of each
repeated interaction in Global, (and to maintain consistency in) Poisson and Com-
mon Knowledge games. Second, ensuring that the theoretical prediction prescribes
that there is equilibrium indeterminacy in the Common Knowledge games, and in
both the Poisson games and in the Global games no player registers, requires a fine
tuning of the parameters in the three game types after each draw of Y . However,
such parameter variability implies the strategic environment would change period af-
ter period unless the drawn Y was the same on consecutive draws.9 It is thus very
much questionable what could have been learned in such a tremendously-volatile en-
vironment within a few dozen iterations. Instead, we chose to focus on single-shot
experiments to maintain the clarity of our conclusions.
4.2 Experiments
Upon logging in, subjects were endowed with £12 in lieu of a show-up fee. Sub-
jects were then provided with the instructions. The instructions accommodated the
underlying assumptions of the corresponding theories. Right after the delivery of
the instructions, subjects were asked to make a decision on whether to buy the cash
amount. Finally, subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire consisting
of demographic questions. With the conclusion of the experimental session, subjects
claimed their earnings from the school office of Social Sciences at the University of
Southampton.
First, we describe the Poisson treatments. In the first stage of the experiment,
subjects were instructed that there would be a computer draw and that the number
drawn would correspond to the number of subjects participating in the second stage
of the experiment.10 Subjects were explicitly told that the number drawn would not
9The probability of hitting the same Y in two consecutive draws is around 1%.
10In each of the Poisson sessions, we sent log in information to 26 subjects. The total number of
participants in each Poisson treatment is shown in Table 1.
11
be revealed to them. The Poisson process was based on n = 17. To circumvent the
difficulties that would arise given the (assumed) unfamiliarity of many subjects with
Poisson probabilities, we applied the specific probabilities onto a roulette wheel (see
Figure 1). We showed the roulette wheel pictorially and noted the following.
You can see that the roulette is not a standard roulette; the number drawn can be
any number between 8 and 26, but not all numbers are equally likely to be drawn.
Numbers closer to 17 (the mean) are more likely to be drawn.11


















Notes: We circumvented the difficulties that would arise given the (assumed) unfamiliarity of many
subjects with Poisson probabilities by applying the specific probabilities onto a roulette wheel.
The instructions specified that subjects not selected to participate in the second stage
of the experiment would be dismissed, but would keep their initial endowment.
In the second stage, subjects had the option to buy the cash amount of £12.50
at a fee of £9 (£10). Subjects were informed that the cash amount of £12.50 would
be issued only if a minimum of 16 (15) subjects registered to buy it, and that the fee
11We restricted the roulette wheel to values up to and inclusive of 26. Above 26, the probability
drops to below 0.007; that is, it is nearly zero.
12
of £9 (£10) required for the purchase was non-refundable and collected immediately.
That is, if a subject registered, the £9 (£10) would be subtracted automatically from
the initial endowment regardless of the number of subjects registering. The subjects
were then asked to indicate whether they would like to register.
Analogous to the Poisson treatments, Global treatments also included a computer
draw in the first stage. The drawn integer (between 5 and 95 inclusive) was referred
to as “Y ” in the instructions. We forewent indicating the actual Y drawn, yet we
provided subjects with a hint about the drawn Y . The hint was an integer within a
range of +5 and −5 from the Y drawn.12 For example, for Y = 25, subjects would
receive a hint integer in the set of {20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30}, where each
integer had a probability of 1
11
of being drawn. The hint integer was indicated in
bold. Additionally, the number of subjects participating in the experiment was set
at N = 17 and was indicated on the screens.
In the second stage of the experiment, subjects had the option to buy the cash
amount of £Y
2
at a non-refundable fee of £9 (£10). The cash amount would be
awarded conditional on at least α(Y ) = C − Y
4
registering to buy it, where C was
replaced in the experimental instructions by 22 (21) when the fee was £9 (£10).
In order to circumvent calculation errors, we indicated on the screen the number of
subjects that needed to register to win the cash amount for every possible value of
Y .13 The subjects had to indicate next whether they would like to register.
In the Common Knowledge controls, subjects were told the number of participants
(i.e. 17), the cash amount (i.e. £12.50), the fee (i.e. £9 or £10) and the threshold
number of registrations (i.e. 16 or 15) to earn the cash amount. The subjects were
then asked to make a decision, analogous to the Poisson and Global treatments.
The experimental sessions took place in October of 2013, May of 2014, and De-
cember of 2017. We conducted two sessions per treatment. The 220 subjects were
recruited from the undergraduate student population of the University of Southamp-
12To map the values here to the notation in Section 3, let Ymax = 95, Ymin = 5, εY = 5 and
thereby x ∈ [0, 100].
13Recall that in the Global games the number of participants is common knowledge. For some val-
ues of Y (e.g. Y = 18), more participants are required to register for the cash amount to be awarded
than the ones commonly known to be present. We conducted sessions where the additional intervals
for implausible realizations of the cash amount are excluded from the experimental instructions and
sessions where these additional intervals are included. The results are almost identical. However,
for the purpose of maintaining consistency between the theory and the games in the experiments,
we chose to include in the analysis only the sessions where the additional intervals are included.
13
ton. We announced our experiments via class presentations. In order to participate,
students replied by e-mail. We then indicated to the respondents the date and time
of the experiment, and asked them to confirm their attendance. Those who confirmed
were subsequently sent log in information (username and password) and the url of
the website. Most of the participants majored in business, economics, finance, and
mathematics. Participants were allowed to participate in only one session. Average
earnings per participant were £9.01. Specifically, in the Common Knowledge games,
subjects made on average £7.24, in the Poisson games, subjects made on average
£11.55, whereas in the Global games, the average earnings were £7.66. The experi-
mental instructions are reported in the Appendix. Some general characteristics of the
sessions are shown in Table 1. Note that each experiment is denoted by an acronym.
In particular, the acronym (type, threshold, fee) consists of the type of game (CK
for Common Knowledge games or P for Poisson games or G for Global games), the
threshold (15 or 16) and the fee (9 or 10).
4.3 Parameter Choices
We justify next our parameter choices. Recall that the drawn Y was 25 and the
cash amount was £Y
2
(i.e. £12.50). The number of players in the games had to be
relatively large to capture the “largeness” of the games while being cost effective.
This motivates our choice of the number of players (N = 17) in Global and Common
Knowledge games. To ensure comparability across game types, the population mean
of the Poisson distribution used in Poisson games (i.e. n = 17) had to also be equal
to the number of players in Global and Common Knowledge games.
The threshold and the fee were chosen next. Presumably, a lower fee and a lower
threshold would make subjects more willing to register to buy the cash amount.
However, ensuring equilibrium uniqueness in the Poison games implies that we can-
not choose low values for both the fee and the threshold number (recall condition (2)).
In addition, the threshold number of registrations should not exceed the number of
players in Common Knowledge games (otherwise, subjects would have a dominant
strategy to forego registering). Our chosen parameters struck a balance when faced
with a tradeoff between low fees and high threshold numbers at the design stage.
To see this, observe the Poisson Cumulative Distribution Table (included in the Ap-
pendix) for n = 17, and fix the cash amount at £12.50. Consider the lowest fee
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Experimental Sessions
Common Knowledge Games
# of Subj. # of Ses. Mean Threshold Fee (£) Amount (£) Acronym
34 2 - 16 9 12.50 CK169
34 2 - 15 10 12.50 CK1510
Poisson Games
# of Subj. # of Ses. Mean Threshold Fee (£) Amount (£) Acronym
40 2 17 16 9 12.50 P169
44 2 17 15 10 12.50 P1510
Global Games
# of Subj. # of Ses. Mean Threshold Fee (£) Amount (£) Acronym





= 16 9 Y
2
= 12.50 G169





= 15 10 Y
2
= 12.50 G1510
Notes: In the first column, we provide the total number of participants in each experiment. We
conducted two sessions per game type. The number of participants in the Global and Common
Knowledge sessions was common knowledge. Notice that the number of participants in each session
in the Global treatments and Common Knowledge controls coincides with the mean n of the Poisson
treatments. Moreover, the cash amount is the same in the three game types. Also, in the calculation
of the threshold in Global games, the symbolic function ⌈·⌉ rounds-up the fraction to the nearest
integer from above. The acronyms in the last column consist of the game type (CK for Common
Knowledge games or P for Poisson games or G for Global games), the threshold (15 or 16) and the
fee (9 or 10).
required for the threshold number of registrations to be equal to the mean number
of the Poisson distribution while satisfying condition (2). Looking at the table and
applying condition (2) this fee is £7.86 (i.e. (1 − 0.3715)12.5 < 7.86). Having a
threshold level which is equal to the mean number of the Poisson distribution could
make subjects perceive it as less likely that the cash amount will be awarded. This in
turn could make subjects unwilling to register. To make it harder for the theoretical
prediction of the Poisson games to be confirmed by subjects’ behavior, we showed
preference towards increasing the fee by merely £1.14 and £2.14 in order to decrease
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the threshold number of registrations by 1 and 2 subjects (i.e. to 16 and 15), respec-
tively. Similarly, lower threshold numbers, such as 11 would imply a fee significantly
close to the cash amount. For example, the fee required for a threshold number of
registrations of 11 is £12.18. It is therefore highly doubtful that a subject would risk
losing the fee of £12.18 to earn the cash amount of £12.50. Instead, we chose to set
the fee at £9 and £10 and thereby to set a threshold number of registrations of 16
and 15, respectively to ensure condition (2), while also ensuring that (a) the fee is not
very close to the awarded cash amount, and (b) the threshold number of registrations
is less than the mean number of the Poisson distribution. It is important to notice
that trying to give the worst chance to Poisson games in the lab, we chose parameters
to barely satisfy condition (2).
Considering the duration of the experiment (approximately 20 minutes) and the
minimum wage in UK (≈ £6 per hour), we stipulated that no subject should get a
compensation below £2. Therefore, the difference between the highest fee (i.e. £10)
and the endowment should not be less than £2, which led us to provide subjects with
an initial endowment of £12.
4.4 General Hypotheses
We formulate next three hypotheses. The first and second hypotheses examine the
behavioral differences across the treatments and the control. This is important in
order to understand whether the types of uncertainty we focus on may influence
strategic behavior in environments with strategic complementarities. Thus, we test
for differences in subjects’ behavior across Common Knowledge and Poisson games,
and Common Knowledge and Global games.
Hypothesis 1 Subjects’ behavior is statistically similar across the Common Knowl-
edge and Poisson games when controlling for the parameter choices of each pairwise
comparison.
Hypothesis 2 Subjects’ behavior is statistically similar across the Common Knowl-
edge and Global games when controlling for the parameter choices of each pairwise
comparison.
Finally, the last hypothesis serves as a test of the theoretical predictions of the
Poisson and Global games. Recall that the Poisson and Global games for the pa-
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rameters specified, predict that no subject will register. However, we know already
from plenty of experiments that subjects cannot perfectly coordinate in single-shot
Coordination games. A single subject choosing to register is a sufficient datapoint to
provide evidence against the theoretical prediction as the latter puts all probability
on just one realization of total registrations (i.e. zero registations to buy the cash
amount). Therefore, our formulated hypothesis is slightly forgiving in the sense that
it allows for small behavioral errors (e.g. due to short attention spans, random dis-
tractions etc.) while at the same time ordering the proximity (defined precisely in
Subsection 5.3) of one treatment over the other to the theoretical prediction.
Hypothesis 3 Subjects’ behavior in the Poisson games is closer (defined precisely in
Subsection 5.3) to the respective theoretical prediction relative to subjects’ behavior
in the Global games, for the parameters specified.
5 Results
Each hypothesis is matched with the corresponding result; that is, result i is a report
on the test of hypothesis i. Note that the decision of a subject in the game is a
binary variable. The subjects who chose not to register to buy the cash amount were
assigned a value of 0. The subjects who chose to register were assigned a value of 1.
5.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the raw data. Recall that subjects had to
decide whether to register to buy the cash amount at a fee or forego this option and
keep the endowment of £12. In the table, we display the frequency and percentage
of subjects who registered, and the frequency and percentage of subjects who did not
register. With the exception of CK1510, in all other experiments, the subjects who
chose not to register outnumbered the ones that chose to register. In the Common
Knowledge and Global experiments, the percentages of those who kept the endowment
of £12 range from 47.1% to 55.9%. In sharp contrast, the percentages in the Poisson
treatments are substantially higher (95.0% in P169 and 95.5% in P1510). Overall,
out of 220 subjects, 69 chose to register and 151 subjects chose not to register. The
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threshold was not met in any of the sessions; consequently, the cash amount was not
awarded.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Common Knowledge Games
Registered Not Registered Amount
Acronym Freq. % Freq. % Awarded?
CK169 16 47.1 18 52.9 No
CK1510 18 52.9 16 47.1 No
Poisson Games
Registered Not Registered Amount
Acronym Freq. % Freq. % Awarded?
P169 2 5.0 38 95.0 No
P1510 2 4.6 42 95.5 No
Global Games
Registered Not Registered Amount
Acronym Freq. % Freq. % Awarded?
G169 15 44.1 19 55.9 No
G1510 16 47.1 18 52.9 No
Total 69 151
Notes: The table indicates the number of subjects who registered, and the number of those who
did not register in each experiment. In addition, we provide the corresponding percentages. The
threshold was not met in any of the sessions. The acronyms consist of the game type (CK for
Common Knowledge games or P for Poisson games or G for Global games), the threshold (15 or 16)
and the fee (9 or 10).
In Table 3, we display the behavior of subjects in the two Global treatments
conditional on the signal received. Recall that in the experiments, Y was set at 25, and
subjects could receive signals in the range of {20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30},
where each signal had a probability of 1
11
of being drawn. Recall further that the
theoretical prediction is that no subject should register irrespective of the signal
received.
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Table 3: Decisions Conditional on Signals
G169 G1510
Signals Registered Not Registered Registered Not Registered
Freq. Freq. Freq. Freq.
20 4 0 2 2
21 0 4 3 1
22 0 2 0 2
23 4 0 3 1
24 2 2 1 3
25 1 5 0 6
26 1 1 0 2
27 2 2 4 0
28 1 1 1 1
29 0 2 2 0
30 - - - -
Notes: The table indicates the number of subjects who registered, and the number of those who
did not register in the two Global treatments conditional on the signal received. The distribution of
signals is identical across the two sessions and the two treatments.
5.2 Subjects’ Behavior Across Game Types
Next, we investigate whether subjects’ decisions varied significantly across the base-
line Common Knowledge games and the Poisson and Global treatments, when the
latter two game types predict a unique equilibrium. The hypotheses are formally
tested through pairwise χ2-tests, where the H0 states that behavior across the pair-
wise comparisons is not statistically different. The results are displayed in Table 4
and formalized in our first and second results.14
Result 1 Subjects’ behavior differs significantly between the Common Knowl-
edge and Poisson games when controlling for the parameter choices of each pairwise
comparison.
14We also conducted non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests and though the p-values only in the last
two comparisons change slightly, the conclusions stay the same.
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Result 2 Subjects’ behavior does not differ significantly between the Common
Knowledge and Global games when controlling for the parameter choices of each
pairwise comparison.
Table 4: Differences in Subjects’ Behavior Across Game Types
Alternative hypothesis: decisioni 6= decisionj
p-values
Common Knowledge games vs Poisson games
CK169 & P169 0.000
CK1510 & P1510 0.000
Common Knowledge games vs Global games
CK169 & G169 0.808
CK1510 & G1510 0.628
Notes: We utilize the χ2-test to determine whether subjects’ decisions differ across game types
(i 6= j) conditional on the same parameters. The acronyms consist of the game type (CK for
Common Knowledge games or P for Poisson games or G for Global games), the threshold (15 or 16)
and the fee (9 or 10).
5.3 Theory and Subjects’ Behavior
Poisson and Global games predict, for the parameters specified, that no subject will
register. In our quest to investigate whether subjects’ behavior in the Poisson and
Global treatments is consistent with the theoretical prediction, we hit a big obstacle
in that standard statistical hypothesis tests cannot be used on this occasion as a
single subject choosing to register is a sufficient datapoint to provide evidence against
the theoretical prediction. As we indicated in Subsection 4.4, existing experimental
literature in single-shot Coordination games indicates that it is extremely unlikely
that all subjects will perfectly coordinate on one outcome. To address this, we develop
a procedure to investigate whether behavior in the lab is close (in a sense defined
shortly) to the theoretical predictions. The key in this procedure is to allow for small
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behavioral errors that might arise due to short attention spans, random distractions
etc. Crucially, the procedure we develop may also be useful for other Binary games
(i.e. games where players choose one of two actions and an equilibrium is of the form
that all players take the same action).15
5.3.1 A Statistical Procedure for Assessing the Closeness of Empirical
and Theoretical Distributions in Binary Games
As already mentioned, we postulate that behavior in the lab may be influenced by
“behavioral errors.” The behavioral error is an iid random variable, which captures
the probability with which the typical subject will take - for reasons “outside the
theoretical model” - an action that is not predicted by the use of game-theoretic ar-
guments in the Binary game under scrutiny. We thus postulate that the total number
of registrations is a random variable Z ∼ Bin(N, π), where Bin(N, π) is the bino-
mial distribution with size parameter N (the number of independent trials/players)
and “success probability” π. The key assumption here is that π ∼ Beta(a, b) for
some exogenously given scalars a ≥ 1, b > 1, where Beta(a, b) is the Beta distribu-
tion with parameters a, b.16 We note that the mean error is a
a+b
and that the case
where subjects make an error with an infinitesimal probability (thus approximating
the game-theoretic prediction) is captured by a
a+b
→ 0.
To investigate whether behavior in the lab is “close” to the game-theoretic pre-
diction of a total of zero registrations, and get a sense of how close it is, we will
examine whether behavior in the lab is consistent with the H0 that Z ∼ Bin(N, π)
with π ∼ Beta(a, b) for predetermined values of a and b, paying particular attention
to determining the set of values of (a, b) for which the H0 is rejected. The latter is
particularly useful in our case because we want to compare how close the empirical
distribution to the theoretical prediction is of alternative treatments for the same
Binary game. Thus, one could simply compare the sets of values of (a, b) for which
the H0 is rejected in the treatments under scrutiny.
15We are indebted to Valentin Patilea and Anastasios Magdalinos for invaluable discussions and
guidance in developing this procedure.
16Conveniently, the distribution Beta(·, ·) is defined on the interval [0, 1], hence can be used to
describe the distribution of a probability value. The restrictions here on a and b are present only to
capture our interpretation of π as an error which is likely to be small. They thus assume away cases
where its pdf is strictly increasing (the case of b = 1) or is not uni-modal (the case of a, b < 1).
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To summarise behavior in the lab and conduct our statistical procedure, we will
use the total number of observed registrations Z as our statistic. We therefore need
to derive the probability distribution of our statistic Z under the above H0. It is
shown in the Appendix that the probability distribution of our statistic Z under the
above H0 is Bin(N,
a
a+b
). Denoting with p(z, a
a+b
) the p-value that corresponds to the
realization z of the statistic Z, it follows that the H0 is rejected given a realization z


















)N−j < α. (3)
We know that p(0; π) = 1 for all π ∈ [0, 1]. We thus have that the H0 cannot be
rejected following a realization z = 0 of the statistic for any mean error a
a+b
. Turning
to the case of a realization z > 0 of the statistic, the level of the mean error plays a
key role in rejecting or not the H0. However, the actual choice of the mean error here
is arbitrary in the absence of any additional information about subjects’ behavior.
Motivated by this, we now ask the alternative question of how big is the range of
values of the mean error for which a given realization z > 0 of the statistic would lead
to a rejection of the H0. We know that p(z; π) is increasing in π for all z ∈ {1, ..., N},
with p(z; 1) = 1 and p(z; 0) = 0. Therefore, there is a critical threshold for the mean
error below which the H0 is rejected, whereas for all (weakly) higher mean errors the









(π(z))j(1− π(z))N−j = α. (4)
Obviously, this threshold mean depends also on N and α, but we suppress this depen-
dence (whenever there is no risk of confusion) for notational simplicity. This threshold
summarizes naturally how “close” to the game-theoretic prediction behavior in the
lab is; specifically, the lower the threshold mean error, the closer it is, because the
interval of mean errors for which the H0 is rejected (for a given realization z > 0) is
smaller.
Note now that p(z, π) is decreasing in z for all π ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, we also
have that π(z) is increasing in z. It follows that the smaller the realization z > 0
of the statistic, the closer the observed behavior is to the game-theoretic prediction.
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Therefore, if one wishes to compare the empirical distributions of two alternative
treatments (that both predict a total of zero registrations in the equilibrium), while
keeping N and α the same across treatments, then one could argue that the theory
that is “closer” to the observed behavior is the one with the lower realization of the
statistic; this is because, the lower the realization of the statistic, the “less often” the
above H0 will be rejected. Next, we use this “characterization” of how close behavior
in the lab is to the game-theoretic prediction - as summarised by the realization of
our statistic - to compare alternative theories regarding their performance in the lab.
5.3.2 Threshold Mean Errors
The threshold mean errors for the Poisson and Global experiments are displayed in
Table 5 when fixing the level of statistical significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
Therefore, keeping N and α the same in the pairwise comparisons, we can argue that
subjects’ behavior in the Poisson experiments is “closer” to the respective theoretical
prediction relative to subjects’ behavior in the Global experiments because the statis-
tic is lower in the Poisson experiments. This result implies that the Global game may
be associated with a higher mean error than the Poisson game. One possible expla-
nation of this might be that, as we have already hinted in Section 3, the calculations
needed in the Global game are more demanding than those in the Poisson game. We
formalize next our third result.
Result 3 Fixing the level of statistical significance, subjects’ behavior in the
Poisson games is closer to the respective theoretical prediction relative to subjects’
behavior in the Global games, for the parameters specified.
5.3.3 Marginal Effects
Given that our sample size is large enough, we also run a probit regression where the
dependent variable is a subject’s decision and the four treatments and two controls
are the covariates with CK169 set as the base. Acknowledging that coefficients in
probit models are up to scale and cannot be directly interpreted, we only present
the marginal effects in Table 6. The standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Crucially, the coefficients are statistically significant only in the Poisson games. The
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Table 5: Threshold Mean Errors










Notes: We utilize the statistical procedure we developed for Binary games. Our H0 states that
Z ∼ Bin(N, π) with π ∼ Beta(a, b) for predetermined values of a ≥ 1, b > 1. Fixing the level of
statistical significance, the lower the statistic, the “less often” the H0 will be rejected. The acronyms
consist of the game type (P for Poisson games or G for Global games), the threshold (15 or 16) and
the fee (9 or 10).
marginal effects imply a decrease in probability of 42.1% (P169) and 42.5% (P1510)
in registering to buy the cash amount in the Poisson treatments.
6 Robustness Analysis
Contrasting the behavior in the Common Knowledge and Poisson games for param-
eters where Poisson games predict a unique equilibrium while Common Knowledge
games predict multiplicity of equilibria, we found that subjects’ behavior across the
two game types is statistically different. This result suggests that uncertainty regard-
ing the number of actual players may influence subjects’ behavior. Specifically, in
the Common Knowledge games, we found that subjects split almost evenly between
not registering and registering. However, in the Poisson games, almost all subjects
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Number of obs 220
Notes: We report marginal effects after a probit regression on decision. CK169 is set as the base
against which the estimated parameters are compared. dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change
from the base level. All standard errors are reported in parentheses. The acronyms consist of the
game type (CK for Common Knowledge games or P for Poisson games or G for Global games), the
threshold (15 or 16) and the fee (9 or 10). *** Significant at the 1% level.
did not register. Crucially, such behavior in the Poisson games is close to the respec-
tive theoretical prediction. Both results are important findings that deserve further
scrutiny. We thus conducted a number of robustness sessions with smaller and larger
sample sizes. The characteristics of the robustness sessions are displayed in Table 7,
and their corresponding experimental instructions are included in the Appendix.
First, we investigated subjects’ behavior with a smaller sample size. We ran four,
Common Knowledge sessions and four, Poisson sessions. In the Common Knowledge
games, four subjects participated in each session. The choice of a setup with four
subjects was motivated by the extensive literature in the Turnaround games (Brandts
and Cooper (2006), Brandts, Cooper, and Fatas (2007) and Cooper, Ioannou, and Qi
(2018)). Consequently, given the choice of N = 4, to ensure comparability between
the Common Knowledge and Poisson games, we set the mean of the Poisson distribu-
tion to n = 4. Moreover, in both game types, the threshold was set to α(Y ) = 4. This
choice was made for two reasons. First, having a setup where the threshold exceeds
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Table 7: Characteristics of Robustness Sessions
Common Knowledge Games
# of Subj. # of Ses. Mean Threshold Fee (£) Amount (£) Acronym
16 4 - 4 10 12.50 SCK410
38 2 - 18 9 12.50 LCK189
38 2 - 17 10 12.50 LCK1710
Poisson Games
# of Subj. # of Ses. Mean Threshold Fee (£) Amount (£) Acronym
16 4 4 4 10 12.50 SP410
48 2 19 18 9 12.50 LP189
46 2 19 17 10 12.50 LP1710
Notes: In the first column, we provide the total number of participants in each experiment. For each
game type, we conducted four sessions in the small sample experiments and two sessions in each of
the large sample experiments. The number of participants in the Common Knowledge sessions was
common knowledge. Note that the number of participants in each session in the Common Knowledge
games coincides with the mean n of the Poisson games. This was done to ensure comparability across
the two game types. The acronyms consist of the magnitude of the sample size (S for small sample
size or L for large sample size), game type (CK for Common Knowledge games or P for Poisson
games), the threshold (4 or 17 or 18) and the fee (9 or 10).
the (expected) number of players is problematic because (a) such setup would invite
experimenter effects, and (b) it would be dominant for subjects to not register in Com-
mon Knowledge games. Second, the only value for the threshold level that does not
exceed the mean population and ensures equilibrium uniqueness in the Poisson games
is in fact α(Y ) = 4 for the parameters specified (i.e. n = 4, Y
2
= £12.50, T ∈ {9, 10}).
Next, we experimented with a larger sample size. Our choice was to set N = 19 in
the Common Knowledge games and n = 19 as the mean of the Poisson distribution
in the Poisson games. For the larger group size, we decided to run two experiments
in an analogous manner to the earlier ones. The fee was set at either T = £9 or
T = £10, which corresponds to a threshold number of 18 and 17, respectively. These
choices ensured equilibrium uniqueness in the Poisson games in a similar manner to
our corresponding parameter choices under the smaller sample sizes.
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Smaller & Larger Sample Sizes
Common Knowledge Games
Registered Not Registered Amount
Acronym Freq. % Freq. % Awarded?
SCK410 7 43.8 9 56.3 No
LCK189 16 42.1 22 57.9 No
LCK1710 18 47.4 20 52.6 No
Poisson Games
Registered Not Registered Amount
Acronym Freq. % Freq. % Awarded?
SP410 1 6.3 15 93.8 No
LP189 3 6.3 45 93.8 No
LP1710 2 4.4 44 95.7 No
Notes: The table indicates the number of subjects who registered, and the number of those who
did not register in each experiment. In addition, we provide the corresponding percentages. The
threshold was not met in any of the sessions. The acronyms consist of the magnitude of the sample
size (S for small sample size or L for large sample size), game type (CK for Common Knowledge
games or P for Poisson games), the threshold (4 or 17 or 18) and the fee (9 or 10).
Table 8 reports descriptive statistics on the raw experimental data of smaller and
larger sample sizes. Similar to the earlier findings, the threshold was not met in any
of the sessions; consequently, the cash amount was not awarded. Furthermore, in the
Common Knowledge games, the number of subjects is split between those choosing
to register and those choosing not to register, whereas, in the Poisson games, only 6
subjects out of the 110 that participated registered. The other 104 subjects did not
register.
In Table 9, we present the robustness analysis for the smaller sample size. For the
analysis, we utilize Fisher’s exact test. Panel A calculates the p-value to determine
whether subjects’ decisions differ across the Common Knowledge and Poisson games
conditional on the same parameters. The H0 states that behavior between the two
game types is not statistically different. The p-value in the pairwise comparison is be-
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Table 9: Robustness Analysis for Small Samples
Panel A
Alternative hypothesis: decisioni 6= decisionj
p-value
Common Knowledge games vs Poisson games
SCK410 & SP410 0.019
Panel B
Threshold mean error
Level of statistical significance is set at 1%
SP410 0.001
Notes: The decision of a subject in the game is a binary variable. The subjects who chose not
to register were assigned a value of 0; otherwise, were assigned a value of 1. For the analysis, we
utilize Fisher’s exact test. Panel A calculates the p-value under the H0 that behavior across the
Common Knowledge and Poisson games (i 6= j) is not statistically different conditional on the same
parameters. Panel B indicates the threshold mean error below which the H0 that Z ∼ Bin(N, π)
with π ∼ Beta(a, b) for predetermined values of a ≥ 1, b > 1 is rejected when the level of statistical
significance is 0.01. The acronyms consist of the magnitude of the sample size (S for small sample
size), game type (CK for Common Knowledge games or P for Poisson games), the threshold (4) and
the fee (10).
low the 2% level of statistical significance. Therefore, theH0 is rejected. Furthermore,
Panel B displays the threshold mean error below which the H0 that Z ∼ Bin(N, π)
with π ∼ Beta(a, b) for predetermined values of a ≥ 1, b > 1 is rejected when the
level of statistical significance is 0.01.
Table 10 presents the robustness analysis for the larger sample size. In particular,
Panel A tests whether subjects’ decisions varied significantly across the Common
Knowledge and Poisson games when controlling for the parameter choices. We find
that subjects’ behavior differs significantly between the two game types. All the p-
values in the pairwise comparisons are below the 1% level of statistical significance.
Panel B indicates the threshold mean error below which the H0 that Z ∼ Bin(N, π)
with π ∼ Beta(a, b) for predetermined values of a ≥ 1, b > 1 is rejected when the level
of statistical significance is 0.01. Finally, in Panel C, we take advantage of the large
sample size to present the marginal effects. LCK189 is set as the base. The standard
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Table 10: Robustness Analysis for Large Samples
Panel A
Alternative hypothesis: decisioni 6= decisionj
p-values
Common Knowledge games vs Poisson games
LCK189 & LP189 0.000
LCK1710 & LP1710 0.000
Panel B
Threshold mean error










Notes: The decision of a subject in the game is a binary variable. The subjects who chose not to
register were assigned a value of 0; otherwise, were assigned a value of 1. In Panel A, we utilize the
χ2-test to determine whether subjects’ decisions differ across the Common Knowledge and Poisson
games (i 6= j) conditional on the same parameters. In addition, Panel B indicates the threshold
mean error below which the H0 that Z ∼ Bin(N, π) with π ∼ Beta(a, b) for predetermined values
of a ≥ 1, b > 1 is rejected when the level of statistical significance is 0.01. In Panel C, we report
marginal effects after a probit regression on decision. LCK189 is set as the base against which the
estimated parameters are compared. dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base
level. All standard errors are reported in parentheses. The acronyms consist of the magnitude of
the sample size (L for large sample size), game type (CK for Common Knowledge games or P for
Poisson games), the threshold (17 or 18) and the fee (9 or 10). *** Significant at the 1% level.
errors are reported in parentheses. The coefficients are statistically significant in the
Poisson games. More specifically, the marginal effects imply a decrease in probability
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of 35.9% in LP189 and 37.8% in LP1710 in registering in the Poisson treatments.17
7 Discussion
Our findings suggest that uncertainty about the number of actual players has a more
significant impact on subjects’ behavior than idiosyncratic uncertainty about eco-
nomic fundamentals, when these two types of uncertainty lead to a prediction of a
unique equilibrium. Furthermore, our statistical test highlights that subjects’ behav-
ior under Poisson population-size uncertainty is closer to the respective theoretical
prediction than subjects’ behavior in the Global games. However, a number of nat-
ural questions still remain unanswered. How does subjects’ behavior change as we
increase (or decrease) the threshold level? Is population uncertainty an inherent de-
terrent of registrations such that under no circumstances will subjects register? Why
is there such a large observed difference in the number of subjects choosing to forego
registering across the Poisson and Global treatments? These questions are addressed
in turn in what follows.
7.1 Comparative Statics
We first conducted a comparative statics exercise to shed light on the interplay be-
tween subjects’ behavior and Poisson population-size uncertainty. Specifically, we
varied the threshold in order to observe its impact on the empirical distribution of
registrations in a Poisson experiment when the fee is £9, the cash amount is £12.50
and the mean number of the Poisson distribution n is 17.18 As controls, we conducted
analogous Common Knowledge experiments where we also varied the threshold level
while keeping fixed the fee at £9, the cash amount at £12.50 and the number of
17We also ran marginal effects with LCK1710 set as the base. With the latter base, the marginal
effects imply a decrease in probability in the Poisson treatments of 41.1% in LP189 and 43.0% in
LP1710 in registering. Both results are statistically significant at the 1% level.
18In principle, we could have varied instead the mean of the Poisson distribution, or the fee, or
even the cash amount. We showed preference towards changing the threshold simply because it led
to the least number of changes in the experimental instructions. For one, changing the mean of the
distribution would lead to different roulette wheels and for another, changing the fee or the cash
amount would lead to further changes in the final payoffs provided.
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participants at 17. Some general characteristics of the comparative statics sessions
are shown in Table 11. In Table 12, we report the corresponding descriptive statistics
on the raw data.19
Table 11: Characteristics of the Comparative Statics Sessions
Common Knowledge Games
# of Subj. # of Ses. Mean Threshold Fee (£) Amount (£) Acronym
17 1 - 13 9 12.50 CK139
17 1 - 14 9 12.50 CK149
17 1 - 15 9 12.50 CK159
17 2 - 16 9 12.50 CK169
17 1 - 17 9 12.50 CK179
17 1 - 18 9 12.50 CK189
Poisson Games
# of Subj. # of Ses. Mean Threshold Fee (£) Amount (£) Acronym
21 1 17 13 9 12.50 P139
14 1 17 14 9 12.50 P149
16 1 17 15 9 12.50 P159
40 2 17 16 9 12.50 P169
23 1 17 17 9 12.50 P179
15 1 17 18 9 12.50 P189
Notes: We provide some general characteristics of the Common Knowledge and Poisson comparative
statics sessions. In the first column, we provide the total number of participants in each experiment.
The acronyms in the last column consist of the game type (CK for Common Knowledge games or
P for Poisson games), the threshold (13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 18) and the fee (9). CK169 and
P169 are reproduced from Table 1.
In Figure 2, we plot the proportion of subjects who did not register over different
thresholds in the Poisson experiments and the Common Knowledge controls. In both
19In CK189, the threshold exceeds the number of subjects commonly known to be in the game.
Clearly, it is dominant to abstain from registering. Though the usefulness of this treatment might
seem questionable, we decided to conduct it anyway to investigate whether subjects do realize the
dominant action. It was comforting to observe 0 registrations in this treatment.
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Table 12: Descriptive Statistics of the Comparative Statics Sessions
Common Knowledge Games
Registered Not Registered Amount
Acronym Freq. % Freq. % Awarded?
CK139 10 58.8 7 41.2 No
CK149 9 52.9 8 47.1 No
CK159 9 52.9 8 47.1 No
CK169 16 47.1 18 52.9 No
CK179 3 17.6 14 82.4 No
CK189 0 0.0 17 100.0 No
Poisson Games
Registered Not Registered Amount
Acronym Freq. % Freq. % Awarded?
P139 9 42.9 12 57.1 No
P149 4 28.6 10 71.4 No
P159 3 18.8 13 81.2 No
P169 2 5.0 38 95.0 No
P179 1 4.3 22 95.7 No
P189 0 0.0 15 100.0 No
Notes: We report the number of subjects who registered, and the number of those who did not
register in the Common Knowledge and Poisson comparative statics sessions. In addition, we provide
the corresponding percentages. CK169 and P169 are reproduced from Table 2.
cases, the line is non-decreasing for the thresholds investigated. Note that for the
threshold levels of 13 − 15 and 18, the theoretical prediction in the Poisson and
Common Knowledge experiments is the same. Namely, for the threshold levels of
13− 15 either all subjects will register or none of the subjects will register, while for
the threshold level of 18, no subject should register. In contrast, for the threshold
levels of 16 and 17, in the Poisson experiments, the theoretical prediction is that
no subject will register, whereas in the Common Knowledge experiments there is
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multiplicity of equilibria.















13 14 15 16 17 18
Threshold
Common Knowledge Games Poisson Games
Notes: The figure displays the proportion of subjects who did not register over different thresholds
in Common Knowledge and Poisson games.
For sufficiently low threshold levels (i.e. 13 and 14), subjects’ behavior is statis-
tically similar (the p-values are 0.328 and 0.171, respectively) across the two game
types. Presumably, the strategic uncertainty subjects face due to the multiplicity
of equilibria, under these threshold levels, leads to similar observed behavior. For
threshold levels 15 and 16, subjects’ behavior is statistically different across the Pois-
son experiments and the Common Knowledge controls (the p-values are 0.041 and
0.000, respectively). For threshold level 17, subjects’ behavior across both game
types is not statistically different (the p-value is 0.166), whereas for threshold level 18
in both game types none of the subjects choose to register. The last two results are
not surprising given that for thresholds 17 and 18, the (expected) number of play-
ers is weakly lower than the specific threshold levels, which reduces significantly the
incentive to register.
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Finally, we focus on behavior across thresholds in the Poisson games. Where
multiplicity of equilibria is predicted, we still observe a large proportion of subjects
not registering, but these proportions are well below the proportion of P169 (i.e. 0.95).
We benchmark our statistical analysis on P169 and compare the empirical distribution
of that experiment to the ones with the other threshold levels. Comparing P169 and
P159, we find that the distributions are marginally statistically similar (the p-value
is 0.103). However, when comparing P169 and P149, and P169 and P139, we find
that the distributions are statistically different (the p-values are 0.016 and 0.000,
respectively). Furthermore, the empirical distribution of P169 is neither statistically
different from that of P179 nor from that of P189 (the p-values are 0.907 and 0.378,
respectively). These results are in large consistent with the theoretical predictions
of the Poisson Coordination games, which postulate different equilibrium outcomes
below threshold level 16.
7.2 Limited Depth of Reasoning
Why is there such a large observed difference in the number of subjects choosing to
forego registering in the Poisson and Global treatments? One plausible explanation
of the large difference may well be that limited depth of reasoning is more likely to
guide subjects towards the “safe” action (i.e. foregoing registering) in the Poisson
games than in the Global games because even if a subject (a) does not reason at high
levels, and (b) believes that it is more likely that the number of other players (in the
game) who register is high,20 there may still be a sizeable probability that there are
not enough players in the game. Consequently, the subject may be deterred from
registering.21 We show next that this can indeed be the case by incorporating in our
model a very simple version of limited depth of reasoning.22
Limited depth of reasoning is a behaviorally-motivated approach that has been
shown to explain well initial behavior in a variety of environments. In our setup,
each player is one of K + 1 types, k = 0, 1, ..., K. Namely, each player can be of
20For instance, subjects could apply “team reasoning” where they choose to register to secure the
best payoff for the group (see Bacharach (1999)).
21We would like to thank an anonymous referee and the Editor for suggesting us to pursue this
explanation.
22For a discussion of limited-depth-of-reasoning models, and an application of “level-k” thinking
in Common Knowledge and Global Coordination games, see Kneeland (2016).
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an “Lk” type of bounded depth of reasoning with k = 0, ..., K capturing the depth
of reasoning. Players of “level-0” (i.e. L0) type are not strategic. Each player of
“level-1” (i.e. L1) type believes that all other players are of L0 type and the number
of other players who register is given by a distribution Q(l|N−) over l = 0, ..., N−
where N− denotes the actual number of other players in the game. L2 types believe
that all other players are of L1 type, and so on and so forth.
23




−) is non-decreasing in N−, for all l̃ = 0, ..., N−.
That is, in bigger groups, L1 types put (weakly) more probability on higher realiza-
tions of the number of other players who register.
Turning to the optimal decisions of each type in the Global games, we note that,
given assumptions A1-A3, the optimal decisions of Lk types, with k ≥ 1, are based
on signal threshold strategies; that is, Lk types register if the received signal is higher
than a threshold signal xk. Moreover, in Poisson games, Lk types, with k ≥ 1,
register if the commonly known mean n is higher than a threshold mean nk with
nK = · · · = n2 ≥ n1 (see the Appendix for the details).
The question now is how does behavior under limited depth of reasoning (i.e. for
1 ≤ k ≤ K) change across the incomplete-information game types we focus on. In
particular, is it the case that there is K > k ≥ 1 and k̂ with k̂ > k such that all
Lk′ types with k
′ > k do not register in the Poisson game (i.e. n ≤ nk
′
) while all
Lk′ types with k
′ ≤ k do register, whereas all Lk′ types with k
′ ≤ k̂ may register in
the Global game (i.e. x > xk
′
for some realized signal x) while, if k̂ < K, all Lk′
types with k′ > k̂ do not? If it turns out that this is the case, then limited depth of
reasoning is more likely to lead to fewer registrations in the Poisson games than in
the Global games.
Echoing the received literature, we assume that K ≤ 3.24 We denote by nk the
mean thresholds under Poisson games, and by xk the signal thresholds under Global
23A general limited-depth-of-reasoning model allows for beliefs to be in general over the whole set
of Lk types; see Kneeland (2016) for a discussion. Our assumption here on the beliefs of Lk types
is close to the “level-k” model of limited depth of reasoning.
24Cornand and Heinemann (2014) and Kneeland (2016) amongst others, argue that reasoning only
goes up to three levels in Global games, while Bosworth (2017) shows that reasoning goes up to, at
least, two levels in Coordination games. Determining the actual depth of reasoning in Global and
Poisson games is an econometric exercise that goes beyond the scope of this paper. We thus defer
it for future work.
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games.25 Assuming Q(l|N−) = 1{l≥⌈ξN−⌉}/(N
−+1−⌈ξN−⌉) with ξ = 0.9,26 we have
that:
• T=9, C=22: x1 = 19, x2 = 25, x3 = 29, and n1 = 15 and n2 = n3 = 17.
• T=10, C=21: x1 = 20, x2 = 26, x3 = 30, and n1 = 15 and n2 = n3 = 17.
Given our experimental parameter choices, regardless of fee T , level-1 types regis-
ter in the Poisson game, whereas level-2 and level-3 types forego registering (recall
that the commonly known mean is n = 17). In the Global game, instead, where
the set of a priori possible realizations of the random signal (given Y = 25) are
{20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30}, we have the following. In the case of T = 9,
level-1 types register, while level-2 and level-3 types may register depending on the
signal the subjects receive. In the case of T = 10, level-3 types forego registering,
while level-1 and level-2 types may register depending on the signal the subjects re-
ceive. In summary, subjects may need a much higher level of reasoning to understand
the optimality of the safe action under uncertainty associated with the payoff than
under Poisson population-size uncertainty. Hence, bounded depth of reasoning is
more likely to guide subjects towards foregoing registering in the Poisson games than
in the Global games.
8 Concluding Remarks
We study experimentally uncertainty about fundamentals in Coordination games.
Specifically, we investigate whether uncertainty about the number of stakeholders or
idiosyncratic uncertainty about the profitability of the risky action may influence be-
havior in the macroeconomy, when these two types of uncertainty lead to a prediction
25Thresholds are derived recursively so that every Lk type with k ≥ 1 best-responds to Lk−1 type.
This implies that if K = 2, then the thresholds for k = 1, 2 are the same as the ones stated in the
main text.
26If sufficiently more L0 types are expected to forego registering, but enough do register, then all
level-k types with k ≥ 1 would forego registering in the Poisson game. For instance, if ξ = 0.75,
then n1 = 17 and n2 = n3 ≥ n1. Had we assumed instead that 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.55, which includes the
case of L0 types described by the uniform distribution (i.e. Q(·|N
−) = 1/(N− + 1)), then, for our
experiments, no subject would have registered in either game, should they have been characterized
by level-k thinking.
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of a unique equilibrium. To do so, we design an online experiment to compare the
behavior of subjects in Poisson and Global Coordination games with that in Com-
mon Knowledge Coordination games. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study to investigate experimentally Poisson Coordination games. Poisson Coordina-
tion games is a recent approach motivated by the fact that the number of potential
speculators is by definition very large in macroeconomic environments. Hence, the
standard assumption that every player takes every other player’s behavior as given
and known when contemplating her best response may be violated. In large societies,
for instance, it may be prohibitively expensive to collect the necessary information
for who all the stakeholders are. Following the suggestion of Myerson (2000), this
approach models the number of actual players as a Poisson random variable.
We find that uncertainty about the number of actual players has a more pro-
nounced impact on subjects’ behavior than idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic
fundamentals when we focus on parameters for which both Poisson and Global games
predict a unique equilibrium.27 In addition, we find that subjects’ behavior in the
Poisson Coordination games is closer to the theoretical prediction than subjects’ be-
havior in the Global Coordination games. Finally, a behaviorally-motivated approach
based on limited depth of reasoning provides a possible explanation of the experimen-
tal results in Global and Poisson games. Consequently, an important avenue for future
research could be an econometric analysis of the levels of reasoning under each game
type. Such fruitful attempts have been undertaken by Bosworth (2017), Cornand
and Heinemann (2014), and Kneeland (2016). However, neither study incorporates
Poisson population-size uncertainty.
27In particular, subjects’ behavior does not differ significantly when comparing Global and Com-
mon Knowledge games. A potential explanation could be that subjects have “homemade priors”
about the other players’ payoff type, which induce similar behavior in Global and Common Knowl-
edge games. Homemade priors refer to subjects’ personal beliefs on other players’ payoff type(s) that
are not induced by the experimenter. The notion of “homemade priors” was introduced by Camerer
and Weigelt (1988) to explain deviations from sequential equilibrium predictions in a reputation-
formation game. However, testing the hypothesis of “homemade priors” in a systematic way is out
of the scope of the current study, and is thus deferred for future research.
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